On Newly-Minted Institutions

Recently, a research centre that I am associated with has been trying to formalise its institutional setup, within the larger university ecosystem. This has led to some fascinating discussions between the various types of researchers and staff on the centre’s payroll, and the leadership group. While a number of topics that cropped up are, from my (limited) experience, typical of a lifecycle of a growing firm (employees locating themselves within the emergent hierarchy, gatekeeping one’s niche, etc.), it was interesting to observe and isolate some very academia-specific oddities.

If one were to do an institutional analysis in such a setting, one of the central questions, in my opinion, becomes how does a (sub-)institution frame their own rules and regulations while operating within a larger (super-)institution with its own set of rules and regulations? Regardless of the freedoms that the sub-institution wants to assert for itself, these will still need to be within the limits set by the super-institution. So in effect, the role of the leadership of the sub-institution becomes one of an underwriter for the super-institution: assess risk exposure of activities, decide on viable risk mitigation, and then calculate a premium.

…which then leads to a very sticky point of conflict: individuals assuming that they are risk-free (or sufficiently low-risk)to be afforded some freedoms, versus the leadership doubling down on their own assessment of risk, and interpretations thereof.

Traditional models of risk assessment always fall back on retrospective data, and in the absence of such data, some instrumental alternatives that serve as a reliable proxy. In the research universe, this invariably becomes an individual’s body of work—and then the primacy of research outputs, as the “currency”, comes into play.

In such a setup, how can a younger staff member (or one who has begun playing the “academic research” game recently) build up their body of work, with the longer-term objective of establishing sufficient data to signal risk-free-ness, and therefore isolating some freedoms for operating?

Even if a person with limited risk assessable data wants to strategically improve said risk assessable data, the tendency of the leadership, especially in such academic/research settings, always veer towards one of maintaining control. Which is fine, and perhaps expected, given their primary role of the underwriter—a typically risk averse role by default.

But in order to get the powers-that-be to reliquish control, one needs to bring in some money. Which one cannot get without risk assessable data, i.e., the same body of work that the powers-that-be want to maintain control over.

Add to this the typical tendencies of the academic-type, particularly in the local context here, to take no initiative of their own without money being guaranteed—something that in the private sector would be an anathema of sorts, where to get some money to developing a pet project requires a proof of concept, that one is expected to work on on their own time (sort of a personal investment). In some ways, this is also understandable, given the constant precarity of the “job” and no securities thereof.

…proper Catch 22²² this.

Complicating this mess further in the local context is the (super-)institution also adding its weight behind the prevalent power setup. One could assume that if one plays the long game and accepts the subservient role for long enough, then one might be able to join the powers-that-be through a faculty position—essentially have the super-institution buy one a ticket to the big leagues. But in a situation where there are such limited (and highly constrained) opportunities, even this game is fraught with, to say the least, challenges. And those who do get the “ticket”, irrespective of their struggles getting there, immediately become one with power setup.

What is the way out of this mess? As rational agents, individuals, especially those who perceive risk to themselves, will always end up playing the game that suits themselves. Why should one care about the institutions? Preserve oneself and one’s future. No one is inherently altruistic.

On the other side, the institutions will continue to play their own game, why should they bother as long as the power structures are maintained and are rewarded by external forces? What incentive do they have to not signal absolute apathy towards the problems of the “working class”.

There is no easy solution.